

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

KEYANA N. CLARK,

Plaintiff,

V.

JASON GARDNER, ET AL.,

Defendants.

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No. 3:19-cv-1609-N-BN

**FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

Plaintiff Keyana N. Clark filed this *pro se* action on July 3, 2019. *See* Dkt. No. 2. Her case was referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference from United States District Judge David C. Godbey. The Court granted Ms. Clark leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. *See* Dkt. No. 7 (advising her that “service of process shall not issue, if at all, until the Court completes its screening of the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)”).

And, on August 21, 2019, the Court entered a Notice of Deficiency and Order [Dkt. No. 8] (the “NOD”), advising Ms. Clark that, upon review of her complaint under Section 1915(e)(2)(B),

it appears that it contains factual allegations, stretching over an extended period of time, against numerous facially distinct defendants – including a state court; Hill County, Texas; and an individual in Baton Rouge. It therefore seems that the defendants are related only because they have been named in the same action. Joining defendants in a single action in this manner violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a). As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has explained,

under Rule 20(a)(2), parties may be joined as defendants if the plaintiff asserts a claim against them “jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” and “any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” A district court has discretion under Rule 20(a) to control the scope of a lawsuit by limiting the number of defendants a plaintiff may hail into court in a particular case. *Arrington v. City of Fairfield*, 414 F.2d 687, 693 (5th Cir. 1969).

Tuft v. Texas, 397 F. App’x 59, 61 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam); cf. *Smith v. Warden, Hardee Corr. Inst.*, 597 F. App’x 1027, 1030 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (one’s “status as a pro se litigant [does] not relieve him of the obligation to comply with Rule 20(a)” (citing *Albra v. Advan, Inc.*, 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007))).

To remedy this deficiency, Court ORDERS Clark to file by **September 23, 2019** an amended complaint – or more than one amended complaint, to the extent that the defendants who she alleges harmed her cannot be joined in a single action consistent with Rule 20(a).

Any amended complaint filed must also comply with the applicable pleading standards.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a plaintiff’s complaint “must contain” “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction”; “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, but a plaintiff must allege more than labels and conclusions, and, while a court must accept all of the plaintiff’s allegations as true, it is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Thus, a threadbare or formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, will not suffice. *See id.*

Instead, to survive dismissal, a plaintiff must “plead facts sufficient to show” that the claims asserted have “substantive plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely, and directly events” that a plaintiff contends entitle him or her to relief. *Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss.*, 574 U.S. 10, 135 S. Ct. 346, 347 (2014) (per curiam) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e)).

Failure to comply with this order will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed for failure to prosecute and obey orders of the Court. *See* FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

Dkt. No. 8 at 1-3 (footnote omitted).

Ms. Clark did not comply with the NOD by September 23, 2019. But, on October 16, 2019, the NOD was returned to the Court as undeliverable to Ms. Clark, with no forwarding address. *See* Dkt. No. 9.

Ms. Clark then appeared in the Clerk's office on January 17, 2020, to file additional documents in this case, *see* Dkt. Nos. 10 & 11, and the Clerk hand-delivered the NOD to Ms. Clark.

Rather than comply with NOD, Ms. Clark, on January 30, 2020, made new filings that appear to add defendants and claims to this action that are distinct from the defendants already named and claims already made. *See* Dkt. Nos. 12 & 13.

Legal Standards and Analysis

Rule 41(b) "authorizes the district court to dismiss an action *sua sponte* for failure to prosecute or comply with a court order." *Griggs v. S.G.E. Mgmt., L.L.C.*, 905 F.3d 835, 844 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing *McCullough v. Lynaugh*, 835 F.2d 1126, 1127 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)); *accord Nottingham v. Warden, Bill Clements Unit*, 837 F.3d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 2016) (failure to comply with a court order); *Rosin v. Thaler*, 450 F. App'x 383, 383-84 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (failure to prosecute).

This authority "flows from the court's inherent power to control its docket and prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases." *Boudwin v. Graystone Ins. Co., Ltd.*, 756 F.2d 399, 401 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing *Link v. Wabash R.R. Co.*, 370 U.S. 626 (1962)); *see also Lopez v. Ark. Cnty. Indep. Sch. Dist.*, 570 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1978) ("Although [Rule 41(b)] is phrased in terms of dismissal on the motion of the

defendant, it is clear that the power is inherent in the court and may be exercised sua sponte whenever necessary to ‘achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.’” (quoting *Link*, 370 U.S. at 631)).

The Court’s authority under Rule 41(b) is not diluted by a party proceeding *pro se*, as “[t]he right of self-representation does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” *Wright v. LBA Hospitality*, 754 F. App’x 298, 300 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting *Hulsey v. Texas*, 929 F.2d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting, in turn, *Birl v. Estelle*, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. Nov. 1981))).

A Rule 41(b) dismissal may be with or without prejudice. *See Long v. Simmons*, 77 F.3d 878, 879-80 (5th Cir. 1996).

Although “[l]esser sanctions such as fines or dismissal without prejudice are usually appropriate before dismissing with prejudice, ... a Rule 41(b) dismissal is appropriate where there is ‘a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff and when lesser sanctions would not serve the best interests of justice.’”

Nottingham, 837 F.3d at 441 (quoting *Bryson v. United States*, 553 F.3d 402, 403 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (in turn quoting *Callip v. Harris Cnty. Child Welfare Dep’t*, 757 F.2d 1513, 1521 (5th Cir. 1985))); *see also Long*, 77 F.3d at 880 (a dismissal with prejudice is appropriate only if the failure to comply with the court order was the result of purposeful delay or contumacious conduct and the imposition of lesser sanctions would be futile); *cf. Nottingham*, 837 F.3d at 442 (noting that “lesser sanctions” may “include assessments of fines, costs, or damages against the plaintiff, conditional dismissal, dismissal without prejudice, and explicit warnings” (quoting *Thrasher v.*

City of Amarillo, 709 F.3d 509, 514 (5th Cir. 2013))).

“When a dismissal is without prejudice but ‘the applicable statute of limitations probably bars future litigation,’” that dismissal operates as – i.e., it is reviewed as – “a dismissal with prejudice.” *Griggs*, 905 F.3d at 844 (quoting *Nottingham*, 837 F.3d at 441); *see, e.g., Wright*, 754 F. App’x at 300 (affirming dismissal under Rule 41(b) – potentially effectively with prejudice – where “[t]he district court had warned Wright of the consequences and ‘allowed [her] a second chance at obtaining service’” but she “disregarded that clear and reasonable order”).

By not filing an amended complaint in compliance with Rule 20(a), as required by the NOD – but instead electing to add additional misjoined defendants to this action, *see* Dkt. Nos. 12 & 13 – Ms. Clark has failed to comply with an order of this Court, after being given an extended period of time to do so, and has thus prevented this action from proceeding.


A Rule 41(b) dismissal of this lawsuit without prejudice is warranted under these circumstances. The undersigned concludes that lesser sanctions would be futile. The Court is not required to delay the disposition of this case until such time as Ms. Clark decides to comply with the Court’s directives. The Court should therefore exercise its inherent power to prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases and *sua sponte* dismiss this action without prejudice.

Recommendation

The Court should dismiss this action without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge's findings, conclusions, and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. *See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n*, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).

DATED: February 4, 2020

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'DLH', followed by a long horizontal line extending to the right.

DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE